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Abstract
This paper reviews the literature on the impact of ethnic diversity on economic
development. Ethnically polarized societies are less likely to agree on the provision of
public goods and more likely to engage in rent seeking activities providing lower levels
of social capital. Initial conditions are important determinants of adverse development
outcomes. The role of decentralization, democracy and markets as potential remedies are
discussed. The paper then presents a number of preliminary hypotheses on the
relationship between diversity and instability in order to stimulate future research.

Key words: Africa, Diversity, Economic Growth, Instability
JEL Codes: O11, O40, O43, O55

2

I. Introduction
There seems to be a general consensus, based on both cross-country regressions
and individual country studies, that ethnic diversity, especially in the Sub-Saharan
African context, is one of the causal factors behind relatively poor development
performance. While much of the past relevant literature focuses on diversity’s impact on
economic growth, we also have evidence that it adversely affects income distribution,
poverty as well as human development. But much less is known about the impact of such
diversity on economic stability or instability in Africa, which is the main focus of this
activity.
It is generally accepted that more than two thousand ethnic groups, generally
lacking the ability to exit from that condition, find themselves in Sub-Saharan Africa, a
fact which can be taken as exogenous, although some have expressed the view that landlocked conditions may have contributed to such marked ethnic diversity. There is also
agreement that it would be a mistake to talk about “the” African economy without
distinguishing at least between natural resource rich country cases, coastal cash crop
exporters, and the land-locked, internally oriented, economies, each encompassing
approximately one-third of the total population of Sub-Saharan Africa.
We intend to proceed as follows: In section II we summarize some of what seems
to be known in the literature with respect to the impact of diversity, however defined, on
development. In section III we present some preliminary hypotheses about diversity and
economic volatility. Finally, in section IV, we will briefly summarize and suggest some
research priorities.
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II.

Diversity and Development
Following Barro’s lead, 1 some people have detected no unique African

explanation for Africa’s poor performance but blame it all on poor policies, the wellknown violations of Washington Consensus strictures, including the lack of openness,
low savings rates, flawed monetary and fiscal policies, as well as lack of access to the
sea, a tropical climate, Dutch disease, corruption and sometimes even the kitchen sink.
Sachs and Warner, 2 for example, follow this line of thinking. On the other hand, Paul
Collier, 3 as well as Collier and Gunning 4 and Easterly and Levine 5 point to the
importance of ethnic diversity. Collier and Gunning, for example, claim that ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF), accounts for 35% of the growth shortfall in SubSaharan Africa, or for 45% if closely linked poor policies are included 6 . José GarciaMontalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol 7 prefer polarization as the measure of diversity of
greatest relevance in most country cases but share the general view of the importance of
diversity’s impact on growth. 8
The main argument being put forward by such authors as Easterly and Levine is
that polarized societies can’t agree on needed public goods and are more likely to engage
in rent-seeking activities. Collier 9 similarly points to ELF as reducing trust, increasing

1

Barro, Robert J., 1991.
Sachs, Jeffrey D & Warner, Andrew M, 1997.
3
Collier, Paul, 2007.
4
Collier, Paul, & Gunning, Jan-Willem, 1999.
5
Easterly, William & Levine, Ross, 1997.
6
ELF is measured by the probability that two randomly chosen individuals in a given country don’t belong
to the same ethnolinguistic group.
7
Montalvo, Jose G. & Reynal-Querol, Marta, 2005.
8
Polarization is measured by the degree of homogeneity within groups, the degree of heterogeneity across
groups, plus, most importantly, the small number of similarly sized groups.
9
Collier, Paul, 1998.
2
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transactions costs and adversely affecting development generally. Bates 10 does not
embrace the ELF measure in the same way but agrees to emphasize that contacts and
contracts, implicit or explicit, within groups, can be quite strong and promote both human
capital and human development within but not across groups. Habyarimana et al 11
provide a framework for examining ethnic versus rival explanations for the lack of
collective action.
Most specialists on the subject seem to hold the view that Africa’s generally low
population density makes it difficult to generate the kind of trust which crosses ethnic
boundaries that is required for the provision of public goods. Frequent human contact
ensures the creation of the required social capital. Individuals as well as entire clans tend
to look at each other and worry about patent inequalities, vertical as well as horizontal,
rather than about their absolute levels of welfare. It is in this sense that, in ethnically
divided societies, each group has its own egalitarian impulse, but that impulse does not
extend across ethnic lines, either by virtue of insurance or altruism. This is in sharp
contrast to the case of some of the more densely populated countries of Asia, where land
scarcity and labor abundance have led to cooperation across ethnicities, especially in the
case of intensive agriculture.
It is also true that strong, within-group loyalty hurts growth in another way, i.e. it
does not pay for the individual member of a clan to be a stand-out, i.e. do well or get
promoted if this results in the rest of his extended family descending on him. Alesina et

10

Bates, Robert H., 2000.
James Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Dan Posner and Jeremy Weinstein, 2009,
Coethnicity : diversity and the dilemmas of collective action , New York : Russell Sage Foundation.

11
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al 12 favor the ELF, while Reynal-Querol, 13 as well as Esteban and Ray, 14 prefer the
concept of polarization, a closely balanced, therefore, contested, ethnic majority
dominance.
There are findings in the literature that low levels of ELF as well as very high
levels do not pose as much of a threat to development as intermediate levels. Others
conclude that we should really be counting much more on polarization when two
contending parties are very close in terms of their power, which may lead to bad policy
and bad development outcomes but also to less stability. The correlation between
fractionalization and polarization is apparently positive and very high at low levels of
ELF but zero or even negative at intermediate and high levels. But we will not spill
much ink here on the question of how diversity is best measured; it clearly depends on
the empirical reality and the question being asked.15
While many authors have discussed the underlying causes of adverse
development outcomes, lots of issues are still open for discussion, and some of these are
by no means irrelevant to the basic question to be addressed in this project. Issues still
open for debate include the importance of initial conditions, including colonial heritage,
natural resource endowment, the role of institutions, broadly defined, as well as the
relevance of the extent of democracy (or lack thereof) in affecting the relationship
between diversity and growth.

12

Alesina, Alberto, Devleeschauwer, Arnaud, Easterly, William, Kurlat, Sergio & Wacziarg , Romain,
2003.
13
Reynal-Querol, Marta, 2002.
14
Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 1994.
15
See Graham Brown and Arnim Langer, 2009: “Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethnicity,” JICA
Research Institute Working Paper, forthcoming.
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With respect to the initial conditions, the relative abundance of land and the low
level of population density have already been referred to. While we are ready to accept
kinship relationships as exogenously given, there can be little doubt that they are a
substitute for social security networks and that any inequality in the initial distribution of
land and other assets historically permitted clan elites to capture the commanding heights
of politics. Unlike the case of the more homogeneous Asian superfamilies, we have here
smaller kinship-loyal families, sustaining cooperation within the group, but without
altruism travelling across ethnicities. Consequently, increased diversity leads to less
collective action with respect to public goods and, at the aggregate level, to more
engagement in free-riding, consequent lower growth and some of the other
aforementioned adverse developmental outcomes. As Avner Greif 16 has also
emphasized, citing European historical evidence, legal and political institutions foster
intra-elite cooperation but inter-group non-cooperation. The same asymmetry exists with
respect to social capital, relatively strong within ethnic groups but not extending across
these groups. Within groups, there is bonding going on, which is relatively weak across
groups. Bridging across groups is, of course, difficult, even if better for optimization in
the economic sense. The larger the extent of diversity the more bonding, and the less
bridging.
The strength of natural resource endowments represents an important dimension
of the initial conditions. Natural resources are an important cause of the likely
asymmetry between different ethnic groups, depending on the vagaries of nature and
culminating in the reduced incentive of those blessed with relative abundance to provide
public goods to others. In Nigeria, for example, a minority ethnic group sitting on oil is
16

Greif, Avner, 1993.
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demanding a larger provision of national public goods, currently creating conflict.
Moreover, the resource-dominant groups are likely to suffer from some manifestation of
the so-called natural resource curse, encouraging rent-seeking and weakening the
pressure for economic or institutional reforms, all of which, of course, contributes to
sustained unequal distributions of income, both of the vertical and horizontal type. In this
setting, local public goods are always preferred over national public goods and the same
sort of asymmetries affect the overall quality of social capital which is based on intensive
trust within rather than across groups. As Jonathan Temple 17 points out, an initial
unequal distribution of income generally affects development negatively. Similarly,
Knack and Keefer 18 support the position that trust is more pronounced, ceteris paribus,
when incomes are more equally distributed.
Clearly, the spillover of social capital across ethnic boundaries, as well as the
willingness to provide national public goods, depends very much on the overall
distribution of income, both of the vertical and horizontal types, which are, to some
extent, overlapping. As Fosu, Bates and Hoeffler 19 point out, heterogeneous societies are
better at private goods provision, working through the market, but not very good at
providing public goods. Greif emphasizes that land or mineral rights are usually critical
and are not at all helped by dysfunctional institutions which obstruct egalitarian
outcomes. Kinship groups can be useful in the private sector, as ethnic minorities
benefit. But in the public sector they can be harmful, as ethnic majorities benefit. What
is not clear and worthy of investigation is whether diversity improves the quality of
private goods via an increase in variety.
17

Temple, Jonathan, 1998.
Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1997.
19
Fosu, Augustin & Bates, Robert & Hoeffler, Anke, 2006.
18
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All of this argues for the possible importance of decentralization. There exists, of
course, a large volume of literature concerning vertical decentralization, both pro and
con, with the pros emphasizing that local communities have more information and are
likely to contain much less ethnic diversity than those at the center, and the cons pointing
to the greater likelihood that local elites will dominate. Vertical decentralization is seen
as reducing friction but may also, as some authors point out, lead to the creation of
regional parties with less interest in public goods at the national level. In other words, if
too many groups form at the local level, no one is strong enough to control the state and
no one is in a position to mobilize an “encompassing interest,” a la Mancur Olson, at the
national level. Diversity builds trust within groups and, while vertical decentralization is
helpful at the local level, it reduces trust at the national level, as well as the provision of
public goods, with results already referred to.
Others, including Bardhan 20 worry about the enhanced possibilities for corruption
at the local level, often dominated by local elites. But the comparison between corruption
at central and local levels is an unresolved issue and can only be settled by empirical,
individual country analysis. In any case, with vertical decentralization leading to smaller
jurisdictions exhibiting less diversity, ELF is reduced but there is a greater danger of
polarization, i.e., a large minority opposing the central government, as pointed out by
Yuichi Sasaoka. 21 The fact is that most central governments are in the hands of a small
elite using public goods to exercise patronage of one kind or another, mostly in the form
of civil service employment.

20
21

Bardhan, Pranab K. & Mookherjee, Dilip, 2000.
Sasaoka, Yuichi, 2007.
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Much less attention is paid in the literature to another kind of decentralization, i.e.
the horizontal type, shifting power from the executive, especially the finance ministry, to
the legislative branches at all levels, as well as to the judiciary, thus providing greater
access for minorities which can make a large difference.22 Trust can be strongly
influenced by such an independent judiciary, a feature rarely in evidence.
As far as I can surmise, the jury is still out with respect to the impact of
democracy on all this. Alesina et al 23 think diversity is less serious in democracies since
minorities are more likely to feel represented. Barro 24 finds that democracy enhances
growth at low levels of income and depresses it at intermediate levels. Most of the
parliamentary systems turn out to be more stable than presidential ones, especially when
there are many clans represented by various political parties. With ethnic diversity more
pronounced at the center, a diverse society benefits more from democracy and a more
competitive political system lowers rent-seeking and increases efficiency. Bates, Greif,
Humphreys and Singh 25 find that authoritarian governments lower TFP and thus growth
and other dimensions of development. On the other hand, Besley and Kudamatsu 26 point
out that autocratic regimes may be extremely good, possibly performing better than
democracies if the electorate is sufficiently well organized. If central government elites
are sedentary bandits this may lead to resistance, possibly violence and lower growth,
something that Bates, Greif et al call “a political trap.” But if the bandits are of the
roving type this is more likely to generate instability as public goods become exceedingly

22

Brancati, Dawn, 2006.
Alesina, Alberto, Devleeschauwer, Arnaud, Easterly, William, Kurlat, Sergio & Wacziarg , Romain,
2003.
24
Barro, Robert J, 1996.
25
Bates, Robert H., Greif, Avner, Humphreys, Macartan & Singh, Smita, 2004.
26
Besley, Timothy J. & Kudamatsu, Masayuki, 2007.
23
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scarce and are fought over. To conclude that democracy has little impact on growth but
could have an impact on stability is a subject to which we shall return.
Since the role of markets is an important issue for our project, in the private sector
minority kinship groups benefit from its relative impersonality while, in the public sector,
minority kinship groups are disadvantaged and majorities benefit. Therefore, the ruling
elite usually prefers the public sector, even if it is less efficient. With respect to particular
production sectors, in agriculture the majority of kinship groups usually eschew social
capital beyond their own jurisdiction. In industry, where minority groups are likely to
gravitate, they benefit from the relatively larger, more urban, private activity. Hence, for
any given distribution of political and economic resources one might expect a more
market oriented, arms length, impersonal system to be superior in terms of developmental
outcomes. However, markets may also accentuate or even create horizontal inequalities,
especially given an initial unequal distribution of natural resources 27 . Moreover, a strong
market orientation is often associated with a lower level of public goods and thus gives
minorities less of an obligation to respect the state in terms of taxes or any other
indication of support.

III. Diversity and Volatility
In this section, given the fact that very little research to date has focused on the
relationship between diversity and instability, we intend to present a number of
preliminary hypotheses which may possibly help stimulate future research in the context
of this project. It is probably useful to differentiate here again among three types, the

27

See Anjan Mukherji, 2009: “Stability of a Market Economy with Diverse Economic Agents,” JICA
Research Institute Working Paper, forthcoming.
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natural resource rich countries, those which have access to the oceans and depend on
primary product exports and those which are landlocked and probably rank among the
poorest.
There can be little doubt that the unequal distribution of natural resource wealth
across different clans can be a cause of instability, as those who are not favored by nature
are likely to object and provoke political instability, leading to economic instability.
There is clearly a tendency for those blessed by nature to deny public goods to the rest of
the body politic across ethnic borders, if only to yield sporadically, when under pressure.
This may be one reason why it has been found in several empirical studies that the
intermediate level of diversity, as measured by the ELF, leads to the worst case of
political instability and, therefore, economic instability.
Turning to primary producing countries with access to trade, terms of trade
fluctuations can be expected to be a major source of instability, especially affecting the
commercially advantaged clans relative to those who are less advantaged. There is ample
evidence that terms of trade fluctuations have very much affected growth in Sub-Saharan
Africa and it would not require a lot of additional research to show that, within particular
countries, the more diverse the society, the more likely that terms of trade fluctuations
will lead to fluctuations in development, including growth, poverty and income
distribution outcomes since they are bound to affect different groups differentially.
Exposure to terms of trade volatility indeed is 50% higher in Sub-Saharan Africa than in
other developing countries, after controlling for differences in incomes per capita. Food
insecurity, also unequally affecting different clans and currently on the rise, can similarly
enhance economic volatility and needs to be analyzed.
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In addition, terms of trade fluctuations are usually badly managed by
governments. During downturns a government typically tries to supplement demand via
government budget deficits and monetary expansion, while, during upturns, it becomes
very bullish and tries to enhance growth by means of foreign borrowing and, once again,
domestic expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. Such asymmetry over the cycle
ultimately leads to crisis, to the imposition of import restrictions, of devaluations, and
other sudden changes in overall policy, in a system under duress, all of which has the
effect of generating instability. Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and Summers 28 indicate that
terms of trade shocks explain much of the growth fluctuations in Africa. Country
characteristics, of course, matter, but policies matter less than the extent of externally
caused volatility, affecting different groups differentially. Internal policies may add to
the problem. For example, export marketing boards, which are still prevalent in some
countries, have erratic price-setting policies, often favoring the commercialized regions
of a country and contributing to overall volatility. To reduce such boom and bust
oscillations one needs a democracy with relatively strong checks and balances, as, for
example, in the Botswana diamonds case.
With respect to all three types of African countries, including the land-locked, it
can be assumed that frequent political turnover and regime change, which has been an
endemic feature of much of Sub-Saharan Africa, leads not only to political but also
economic instability. It should not be difficult to trace the number of coups, changes in
governments, even in ministers of finance, as causal agents in this respect. Oscillation
between a market orientation and a controls orientation in policy, which is often referred
to as sub-optimal for development generally, can also be considered a likely cause of
28

Easterly, William, Kremer, Michael, Pritchett, Lant & Summers, Lawrence H., 1993.
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instability, especially if these decisions are the result of continuous bargaining between
different ethnic groups and the central government. Power-sharing as a solution, via
proportional representation, mutual veto and decentralization 29 has not been much in
evidence in Africa.
If decentralization takes the usual form of delegation or deconcentration, instead
of true devolution to local bodies in the form of fiscal decentralization, reliance on the
center’s funds for public goods is retained. This maintains power in the hands of those
who control lives and is likely to lead to lobbying, continuous bargaining, uncertainty,
conflict and economic fluctuations. As Kimenyi 30 points out, ethnic heterogeneity leads
to the under-provision of non-excludable public goods but favors excludable patronage
goods. Resistance to this system by minorities risks higher instability, especially if
combined with the central government’s inequitable tax and other direct interventions in
favor of the elite, permitting trust to fluctuate and decline over time. Of course, if clan
population proportions change, especially in closely split polarized societies, another
reason for volatility makes its appearance. The possibility of alternating roving and
stationary bandit regimes is not at all unrealistic and also relevant to the issue of
instability.
Another source of instability results from the gradual shift in much of SubSaharan Africa from traditional communal land ownership, with virtually unlimited
supplies of land, to private ownership and modern property rights, as land shortage,
combined with population increase, leads to titling, insecurity and volatility.

29
30

Lijphart, Arend, 1977.
Kimenyi, Mwangi S., 2006.
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Other agents of globalization may well contribute to economic instability.
Examples here include:
a)

Remittances from abroad may be aggravating horizontal and vertical
inequality, as certain ethnic communities are more able to adapt and migrate
abroad; and

b)

Unequal development of private capital markets, which is also likely to have
a differential impact on different ethnic groups.

c)

Moreover, it is no secret that foreign aid agencies often play favorites,
supporting natural resource-rich regions or politically attractive clans from
their own foreign policy points of view, thus exacerbating both horizontal
and vertical inequalities and causing political as well as economic
instability. More generally, multilateral financial institutions and bilateral
aid agencies have not been sufficiently aware of or sensitive to the impact of
the policies they advocate and the projects they implement on the provision
of public goods to different communities, causing horizontal inequalities.
Aid-funded projects are likely to induce rent-seeking, favor the affluent,
weaken the social fabric, and represent instability – creating exogenous
shocks.

d)

NGOs, which are increasingly numerous in quantity and influential in terms
of resources, but weak in terms of cohesion and accountability, are also
often found to be competing with each other and jockeying for favor among
various ethnic groups, thus making a contribution to an increase in volatility.
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e)

Finally, it is generally acknowledged that global warming has been
associated with an increased incidence of different kinds of natural disaster.
As such exogenous shocks become more frequent they are prone to
contribute increasingly to instability in Sub-Saharan Africa, customarily
affecting the poorer groups as well as different ethnic groups
disproportionately. Receding rangelands, a consequence of desertification, is
threatening the livelihood of pastoralists. Drying rivers are reducing
cultivatable lands. This is causing inter-community or ethnic conflicts, and
producing “climate change refugees.” In other words, climate change will
likely lead to increased economic instability in the ethnically diverse
countries of Africa.

IV. Concluding Thoughts
In conclusion, it should be amply clear that we know a good deal about the impact
of diversity on development, mostly on growth, but that we have relatively little evidence
to date on the impact of diversity on instability. Therefore this particular project seems to
have ample room for making a substantial contribution.
What I’ve tried to do in section II is to cite as many of the known facts and
conclusions that have come to my attention from research in the past on the subject of the
impact of diversity on growth and to present best guesses, not yet based on the literature,
of what causal links between diversity and instability might be worthy of future
examination, in Section III. Country studies, such as pitting Uganda versus Kenya and
Nigeria versus Botswana would certainly be indicated.
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It is suggested that careful attention be given to decentralization which may be
stabilizing if it is accompanied by fiscal devolution, but not if the center retains the bulk
of resources and is able to favor culturally aligned groups and those already favored by
nature at the local level. Thus, the best sequence seems to be economic reforms followed
by both political and fiscal decentralization. Comparative studies of constitutions and the
extent of adherence to them are relevant. The role of foreign capital, especially foreign
aid and NGO flows, possibly, but not necessarily, contributing to instability, needs to be
examined.
The basic normative issue before us is how enhanced and non volatile trust can be
generated in the presence of diversity and how the related issue of sustainably
encouraging the provision of national public goods can best be tackled. This is where
economic historians, anthropologists, political scientists and development economists can
most usefully apply their combined talents. As Jean-Philippe Platteau, 31 aptly put it
“how generalized trust… can be established … is probably one of the most challenging
questions confronting development scholars.”

31

Platteau, Jean-Phiilippe, 1994.
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